Egypt: Autopsy of a coup d’etat

These 3 articles (from the Guardian, New York Times, and the WashingtonPost) do a good job at explaining the background of the coup d’etat conducted by the Egyptian military junta. What is clear from these 3 articles is that the military and the clan of former president Mubarak left Morsi no room for maneuvering, acting independently and freely, or to save face.

One the one hand, i understand why Morsi turned down the offer of nominating a new prime minister and a new cabinet with a transfer of all legislative prerogatives to the new PM. If Morsi had accepted that offer under duress, his presidency would have been technically over. The military and the Mubarak clan would have steamrolled him, would have turned him into a rubber stamp. And this would have alienated his base. On the other hand, I think Morsi missed an opportunity early on in his presidency–after he swept out the highest ranks of Egypt’s powerful military and installed new top brass–for taking the initiative and nominating a new PM on his own time table and taking them all by surprise. He didn’t do that. He wasn’t able to properly read the tea leaves, so to speak.

What these 3 articles (see below) show is that Morsi is not a political animal. He’s a creature of the opposition, he made his bones in a clandestine opposition movement, and he is not so much used to political wheelings and dealings, bargaining and logrolling, and compromising and turning political setbacks into victories. This is a classic feature of all leaders who come from the same background as Morsi. The only way for them to survive is to clean house completely and build their own (like Chavez did). If they don’t do that, they have to be super shrewd and conniving (like Erdogan), and that’s the art of politics. Morsi was neither, and he paid the price for that (just like Boudiaf). I also blame his advisers for not warning him of the dangers ahead or directing him to take the initiative. As the fictional character of the television show, The West Wing, Josiah Bartlet said in a dialog with the secretary of Agriculture Roger Tribbey, the cabinet member who stayed behind during a State of the Union address:

You got a best friend?”Is he smarter than you?” Then, That’s your chief of staff.” (click link for video)

It’s not enough to be smart as president. You need to surround yourself with advisers who are 10 times smarter than you. Ask Machiavelli and read “The Prince” and you would know the importance of a good, loyal, and smart adviser.

Mohamed Morsi’s final days – the inside story

Egypt’s first freely elected president found himself isolated and abandoned by allies as even his guards simply stepped away

  • Hamza Hendawi and Maggie Michael, Associated Press
  •, Friday 5 July 2013 06.23 EDT
Mohamed Morsi

Mohamed Morsi had been at odds with virtually every institution in the country in recent months. Photograph: AFP/Getty Images

The army chief came to President Mohammed Morsi with a simple demand: Step down on your own.

“Over my dead body!” Morsi replied to General Abdel Fatah al-Sisi on Monday, two days before the army eventually ousted him after a year in office.

In the end, Egypt‘s first freely elected president found himself isolated, abandoned by allies and no one in the army or police willing to support him.

Even his Republican Guards simply stepped away as army commandos came to take him to an undisclosed defence ministry facility, according to army, security and Muslim Brotherhood officials, who gave the Associated Press an account of Morsi’s final hours in office.

The Muslim Brotherhood officials said they saw the end coming for Morsi as early as 23 June – a week before the opposition planned its first big protest. The military gave the president seven days to work out his differences with the opposition.

In recent months, Morsi had been at odds with virtually every institution in the country, including leading Muslim and Christian clerics, the judiciary, the armed forces, the police and intelligence agencies. His political opponents fuelled popular anger that Morsi was giving too much power to the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists, and had failed to tackle Egypt’s mounting economic problems.

There was such distrust between Morsi and the security agencies that they began withholding information from him – deploying troops and armour in cities without his knowledge.

Police also refused to protect Muslim Brotherhood offices that came under attack in the latest wave of protests.

Therefore, when Morsi was fighting for his survival, there was no one to turn to, except calling for outside help through western ambassadors and a small coterie of aides from the Brotherhood who could do little more than help him record two last-minute speeches.

In those remarks, he emotionally emphasised his electoral legitimacy – a topic that Morsi repeatedly raised in the talks with Sisi.

Early this week, during two meetings in as many days, Morsi, Sisi and Hesham Kandil, the prime minister, sat down to discuss ways out of the crisis.

But Morsi kept returning to the mandate he won in the June 2012 balloting, according to one of the officials. He said Morsi wouldn’t address the mass protests or any of the country’s most pressing problems – tenuous security, rising prices, unemployment, power cuts and traffic congestion.

A Brotherhood spokesman, Murad Ali, said the military had already decided that Morsi had to go, and Sisi would not entertain any of the concessions that the president was prepared to make.

“We were naive … We didn’t imagine betrayal would go this far,” Ali said.

“It was like, ‘either we put you in jail, or you come out and announce you are resigning,'” Ali added.

Brotherhood officials said they saw the end coming.

“We knew it was over on 23 June. Western ambassadors told us that,” said another Brotherhood spokesman. US ambassador Anne Patterson was one of the envoys, he added.

Morsi searched for allies in the army, ordering two top aides – Asaad el-Sheikh and Rifaah el-Tahtawy – to establish contact with potentially sympathetic officers in the 2nd Field Army based in Port Said and Ismailia on the Suez Canal.

The objective was to find a bargaining chip to use with Sisi, security officials with firsthand knowledge of the contacts said.

There were no signs that Morsi’s overtures had any effect, but Sisi, on learning of the contacts, took no chances. He issued directives to all unit commanders not to engage in any contacts with the presidential palace and, as a precaution, dispatched elite troops to units whose commanders had been contacted by Morsi’s aides.

The end nears

On the surface, Morsi wanted to give the impression that the government was conducting business as usual.

His offices released statements about meetings with cabinet ministers to discuss issues such as the availability of basic food items during Ramadan when Muslims feast on food after a day of dawn-to-dusk fasting. He had four cabinet ministers talk to TV reporters in the presidential palace about fuel shortages and power cuts.

The opposition had set its first mass protest for 30 June, the anniversary of his inauguration, but the demonstrations began early, and Morsi had to stop working at Ittihadiya palace on 26 June.

The next day, he and his family moved into the Cairo headquarters of the Republican Guards, an army branch that protects the president.

Morsi worked at the Qasr El Qouba palace and continued to do so until 30 June, when the Republican Guards advised him to stay put at their headquarters.

His foreign policy aide, Essam el-Haddad, telephoned western governments to put an optimistic spin on events, according to a military official. Haddad was also issuing statements in English to the foreign media, saying that the millions out on the streets did not represent all Egyptians, and that the military intervention amounted to a textbook coup.

According to the usually authoritative newspaper Al-Ahram, Morsi was offered safe passage to Turkey, Libya or elsewhere, but he declined. He also was offered immunity from prosecution if he voluntarily stepped down.

Morsi gave a speech late on Tuesday in which he vowed to stay in power and urged supporters to fight to protect his legitimacy.

Soon after, Sisi placed him under “confinement” in the Republican Guard headquarters. The next day the military’s deadline to Morsi expired. At 5am troops began deploying across major cities and the military posted videos of the movements to its Facebook page in a bid to reassure the public. Republican Guards assigned to the president and his aides walked away at midday and army commandos arrived.

There was no commotion and Morsi went quietly. That evening, Sisi announced Morsi’s removal.

In Egypt, long road to military coup

By , Published: July 5

CAIRO — Less than a year ago, then-President Mohamed Morsi swept out the highest ranks of Egypt’s powerful military and installed new top brass that many expected would be loyal to him.

The Islamist leader enjoyed a three-month honeymoon with his armed forces as a new generation of officers undertook long-delayed modernizations and appeared — for the first time — to be solidly under civilian control. But the relationship soured as Morsi’s rule increasingly challenged the core interests of the military, which functions as a major business power in Egypt in addition to its more traditional role ensuring the security and stability of the nation.

The disagreements started after Morsi’s decree, late one November night, that he had near-unlimited powers over the country and escalated as Egypt’s economy stumbled. The struggles peaked in June, when Morsi stood by twice as officials around him called for Egyptian aggression against Ethiopia and Syria, threatening to suck Egypt into conflicts that it could ill afford, former military officials said.

Defense Minister Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, a U.S.-trained Islamist sympathizer who was Morsi’s handpicked man for the office, informed the president on June 22 that he needed to do more to unite the country. The military’s decision to step in was sealed after millions of anti-Morsi protesters took to the streets eight days later, Sisi said in a nationally televised speech announcing the takeover on Wednesday.

Now, with fighter jets performing maneuvers in the clear Cairo sky and armored personnel carriers patrolling the streets, the military is again explicitly in control of an Egypt that it led — either directly or from behind the scenes — for almost six decades before Morsi’s 368 days in power. But for all the military’s might, it appeared unable to restore peace to the streets of Egypt as clashes erupted Friday and continued into Saturday around the nation between Morsi’s supporters and his opponents, leaving at least 30 people dead, according to the Egyptian Ministry of Health.

“The dangers of Morsi’s rule have been apparent for some time now, from the decisions that he has taken and the way he managed the country,” said Talaat Mosallam, a retired major general in Egypt’s army. By June 30, he said, “it was perfectly clear that Morsi’s continuation would cause a very violent conflict between the opposition and his supporters. At that point the armed forces knew they had to move.”

Egypt’s military establishment has long held paramount power over the country, with generals turning themselves into business tycoons over the three decades that President Hosni Mubarak was in office. The army’s business holdings are shadowy and vast, estimated at anywhere between 10 and 30 percent of the economy, and top leaders socialize with each other in manicured country clubs a world away from the vast, smog-filled streets where most people scrape by on just dollars a day. Military officers had run the country since the 1952 revolution, and their leadership has long been willing to go to great lengths to ensure the stability of both their own insular society and Egypt as a whole.

“Their rhetoric has always been the same: that they are there and that they won’t allow Egypt to slip into the dark tunnel,” said Michael Hanna, an expert on the Egyptian military at the Century Foundation in New York.

‘Many governing errors’

The two events in June, in which officials close to Morsi called for aggression in Ethiopia and Syria, put new strains on an already tense relationship between the leader and a military that believed the country could ill afford to involve itself in conflict.

On June 2, politicians meeting with Morsi — unaware that they were on live television — suggested sabotaging an Ethiopian project to build a dam on the Nile by arming Ethiopian rebels, launching a campaign to boast of Egypt’s military might and finishing the job with Egyptian fighter jets. Morsi refrained from giving them explicit support, but he also said later that “all options are open” to defend Egypt’s water supply.

Then, on June 15, Morsi participated in a pro-Syrian-rebel rally at which Sunni clerics repeatedly called for “holy war” in Syria — an implicit push for sectarian violence against Shiites and Alawites. Morsi himself did not call for violence, but he spoke immediately after an ultraconservative Salafist preacher who called Shiites “infidels,” and he said nothing to distance himself from the remarks. Instead, he asserted that the Egyptian “nation, leadership and army will not abandon the Syrian people,” according to Egypt’s flagship state-run al-
Ahram newspaper.

The remarks spooked the military, several analysts said, with many top officers conditioned to be concerned about Islamist sectarianism after decades in which they had worked to suppress the Muslim Brotherhood.

“It was quite clear throughout the past year that Morsi was incompetent and there were many governing errors carried out,” said Mohamed Kadry Said, a former major general who is an analyst at the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo and whose remarks echo those made privately by several military officers.

Forming a new leadership

But the final straw, many analysts said, was the Sunday protests that turned millions of Morsi opponents into the streets.

“Had protests really fizzled, I’m not sure the military would have been prepared to intervene,” said Robert Springborg, an expert on the Egyptian military at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif. “It brought together the civilian opposition. For the first time they were really singing off the same hymn sheet. Suddenly everyone was together” against the Muslim Brotherhood.

Now the military’s decisions will have a crucial role in shaping the weeks and months ahead, analysts say, as a fragile interim civilian government scrambles to follow a publicly announced road map and reassemble the basic components of a constitutional democracy. In the back of future leaders’ minds will be the fate of politicians who came before.

The potential for conflict is great — and it has already started, with security forces rounding up Muslim Brotherhood leaders at the same time Egypt’s new interim president was calling to include Islamist representatives in a unity government. And a conflict exists within the military’s own rhetoric, as it has struggled to balance law-and-order principles with the right to protest.

“Freedom of expression and speech is guaranteed for everyone,” a military spokesman said on the military’s Facebook page Thursday. But “the excessive use of this right . . . could represent a threat to social peace and the country’s best interest,” it said

Sharaf al-Hourani and William Booth contributed to this report.

  1. July 23, 2013 at 8:45 pm

    This is great. This is the first time i read some of the details of this uprising or coup…i don’t know anymore. I live in Cairo and i am not sure what is going on anymore. All i know is that the situation is scary and dangerous and Masser has gone. We will live to regret the decision of removing Morsi. What were we thinking really? Someone stupid idiots thought that alikhwana will go underground and disappear. We were high on something, but definitively we were not thinking straight. Now, i am really scared, honest to god i am scared of civil war. We have gone tooooooooooo far and we need to back off nowe before it’s too late.

    Salim Mouhendesse, from Cairo, Egypt.

    • July 26, 2013 at 6:30 pm

      Mr. Mouhendesse, please do not hesitate to comment on anything that you might see as wrong. You are on the ground in Cairo and it would be great to have your input directly. If you wish to write entire post in Arabic, please do–in fact, any language will be fine with me. If you just wish comment, please do.

      Good luck to you over there, and keep calm and carry on as the Brits would to say.

  2. Martha
    July 16, 2013 at 6:07 pm

    I love what you have up too since the state of the Egyptian crisis/coup. This is a very clever work that compiles articles that might fall through the cracks.


  3. dylan
    July 14, 2013 at 4:08 pm

    Top post. I look forward to reading more. Cheers

  4. Deamon A
    July 7, 2013 at 11:56 am

    WOW, the details of his ousting and the story behind it is getting uglier by the day. From these 3 articles, it seems that the military wanted him out no matter what. This is just ugly. I am certain that we will learn more details about this coup in the next a few weeks or months. I agree with you that the military plunged egypt into a civil war. I don’t see how they can avoid that. The cats are out of the bag so to speak.

  1. August 20, 2013 at 2:36 pm
  2. July 16, 2013 at 5:46 pm

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